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Abstract. Ubiquitous access to patient medical records is an important aspect 
of caring for patient safety. Unavailability of sufficient medical information at 
the patient point-of-care could possibly lead to a fatality.  In this paper w e 
propose employing emergent technologies such as Java SIM Cards (JSC), 
Smart Phones (SP), Next Generation Networks (NGN), Near Field 
Communications (NFC), Public Key Infrastructure (PKI), and Biometric 
Identification to develop a secure framework and related protocols for 
ubiquitous access to Electronic Health Records (EHRs). A partial EHR 
contained within a JSC can be used at the patient point-of-care in order to help 
quick diagnosis of a patient’s problems.  The full EHR can be accessed from an 
Electronic Healthcare Records Centre (EHRC). 
Keywords: Electronic Healthcare Record, Java SIM Card , Next Generation 
Network, Smart Phone, Near Field communication, Biometric Identification, 
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1 Introduction 
Ubiquitous access to a patient’s medical records is an important aspect of caring for 
patient safety. Unavailability of sufficient medical information at the patient point -of-
care could possibly lead to a fatality.  The U.S. Institute of Medicine (IOM) has 
reported that between 44,000 to 98,000 people die each year due to medical errors, 
such as incorrect medication dosages due to poor legibility in manual records, or 
delays in consolidating needed medical information to discern the proper intervention. 
Also the IOM reports the lack of well designed systems and procedures needed to 
handle the complexity of health care distribution caused 90 percent of medical     
errors [1]. Most of these medical errors could be avoided with access to patient’s 
medical information at the point of care [2]. Ubiquitous access to patient’s medical 
information is a technique which enables Healthcare systems to have access to 
patient’s medical information wherever it is needed electronically. It has the potential 
to revolutionize next generation medical applications based on Electronic Health 
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increase patient safety and reduce medical errors and costs. 
Therefore, in this paper, we propose a secure framework and related protocols by 
taking advantage of new technologies such as Java SIM Cards (JSC), Smart Phones
(SP), Next Generation Networks (NGN), Near Field Communications (NFC), and 
Biometric Identification for ubiquitous access to patient’s medical information at the 
point-of-care. 
The aim of our framework and related protocols is to overcome pervious work’s 
limitations by taking advantage of SIM cards  and the new technologies mentioned 
above. Briefly, our approach could offer the full benefits of accessing an up-to-date, 
precise, and comprehensive medical history of a patient, whilst its mobility will 
provide access to medical and patient information everywhere it is needed. 
2 Related Work 
Ubiquitous Access to patient information has been investigated by many researchers 
such as Abraham [2], Issa [3] , Chenhui [4], and others. Finding an efficient solution 
that can be secure and implemented in existing Medicare systems is a challenging 
issue. Some researchers such as Bishop [5] and Chan [6] have proposed using a 
Medicare card, which is based on a Smart Card, as a potential solution to access 
patient’s health records anywhere and anytime. 
However, using Medicare cards as a repository of m edical in formation at the 
patient point-of-care imposes some limitations on patients’ emergency medical care
and privacy. These include the inability to detect and inform patient’s location, call 
and send patient information to an emergency room automatically, and computerise 
and secure interaction with the patient. Our approach aims to overcome these 
limitations by exploiting the additional capabilities of Java SIM Card and new 
communication technologies. 
3 Framework Overview
Our framework is based on developing a secure conceptual structure to enable an 
Authorised Person (AP) such as a doctor to have Ubiquitous Access (UA) to 
a patient’s medical record on a national scale. As shown in Fig. 1, the proposed 
framework relies on new technologies such as Java SIM Cards  (JSC), Smart Phones
(SP), Near Field Communications (NFC), Next Generation Networks (NGN), Public 
Key Infrastructure (PKI), Secure Sockets Layer/Transport Layer Security (SSL/TLS) 
and Biometric Identification (BI). 
This framework includes six major parts: the Patient  (P), a Smart Phone (SP), an 
Authorised Person (AP), an Authorised Device (AD), a Trusted Third Party (TTP), 
and an Electronic Health Record Centre (EHRC). The TTP and the EHRC operate at
the national (N-TTP, N-EHRC) and state (S -TTP, S-EHRC) levels. The SP is utilised 
to computerise interaction with a patient. The AD, which is a kind of a Smart Phone
or Personal Computer  (PC), is used by an AP such as a doctor to communicate with 
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national scale. The N-TTP is employed to manage the whole framework’s activities. 
The S-TTP and S-EHRC work at  state levels. (For the purposes of this paper, we 
assume the existence of a central, national EHRC, as well as distributed state-level 
EHRCs; however the proposed communication framework does not rely crucially on 
having a centralised database. If necessary its functions can be distributed to the state 
level.)
Mobile phones, in general, fall into three broad categories: basic phones, 
multimedia phones, and Smart Phones [7]. A Smart Phone is a handheld device which 
has both mobile phone and PC-like abilities together. Smart Phones have become 
an emerging phenomenon for personal and business voice, data, e-mail, and Internet 
access, and could now form the basis of a healthcare network.
Fig. 1. National Framework for Managing Ubiquitous Electronic Health Records
The Trusted Third Party must be a powerful server which is able to manage very 
large amounts data and traffic. We assume it is facilitated with auditing, logging, 
authorisation, identification, and storage capabilities. Furthermore, the TTP must be
connected to a database which contains all details of Authorised Persons and patients, 
including SIM IDs, devices’ serial numbers,  fingerprint templates, names and national 
IDs. Such a capability is now possible using current generation network servers from 
companies such as HP, IBM, or Dell.
The aforementioned characteristics of the SP, AD and TTP make them suitable for 
the needs of our framework. Our framework needs to provide ubiquitous access to a 
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a central management system.  
 3.1  Proposed National Communication Framework  
As shown in Fig. 1, our framework is divided into three levels: the national level, the 
state level, and the patient level. Each level has its own database which is responsible 
for storing patient medical records accordingly. Therefore, the framework includes 
three kinds of databases: a National -Electronic Health Records Centre (N-EHRC), 
State-Electronic Health Records Centres (S-EHRC), and patient databases (Java SIM 
Cards). Having both national and state databases is an effective strategy for achieving 
fault tolerance, better performance, and reliable access to large downloads of data. 
The patient database stored in a JSC is responsible for storing critical medical 
information such as their past medical history, blood type, allergies, and the http links 
(Uniform Resource Locator ) to the original records and medical images in the central 
database that we called the Electronic Health Records Centre (EHRC). 
As the patient’s point-of-care location cannot be prearranged, the Java SIM Card, 
due to its intrinsic nature of mobility, can play the role of a portable data repository to 
help quick diagnosis of a patient’s problems. The JSC can make the patient’s medical 
records available across the country or internationally even when the network is not 
available. 
The National-Electronic Health Record Centre ( N-EHRC) is a central database 
which contains all patients’ EHRs on a national scale. It is responsible for storing 
the medical records for all the patients in a particular country. This database must be 
hosted and maintained by a government authorised organisation. The location of this 
database depends on the network topology in a particular country. The N prefix 
denotes the country’s abbreviation, e.g., ‘AU’ for Australia and ‘IR’ for Iran. 
Therefore, the central database which contains all Australian medical records is 
designated the AU-EHRC. 
The state database or State-Electronic Health Record Centre (S-EHRC) is 
the second tier database and is responsible for storing patients’ EHRs at an intrastate 
level. The S-EHRC stores a copy of EHRs which belong to patients who reside in a 
specific state (or province or other relevant division within a country). This database 
must be hosted and maintained by a local government authority. Again the location 
of this database depends on the network topology in a particular country and state. 
The S-EHRC and N-EHRC work together to provide fault tolerance, better 
performance, and reliable access to EHRs. The S prefix denotes an abbreviation for 
the state within a country, e.g., ‘QLD’ for Queensland or ‘NSW’ for New South 
Wales. Hence, the central database which contains all Queensland’s patients’ medical 
records is designated the QLD-EHRC.
As shown in Fig. 1, the framework also includes two other entities the National 
Trusted Third Party (N-TTP) and the equivalent state-based Trusted Third Parties  
(S-TTP). The N-TTP operates on a national scale and S-TTPs work on an intrastate 
scale. The S-TTP is in charge of managing the Smart Phones and Authorised Devices
while the N-TTP is responsible for managing the S-TTPs including authorising, 
updating, monitoring, enabling, and disabling the S-TTPs.
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associated with the operation, communication, and maintenance of the SP, AD and     
S-EHRC within the particular state. For instance, the S-TTP determines an Access 
Level (AL) for the EHRs based on three factors: the identification of an Authorised 
Device and Authorised Person who wants to have access to a patient’s medical 
information, the patient’s consent, and the relevant healthcare legislation. Based on 
these factors the S-TTP maintains three access control lists: Discretionary Access 
Control (DAC), Mandatory Access Control (MAC), and Role Based Access Control
(RBAC) [8, 9]. The MAC and DAC list are made by using the patient’s consent. The 
RBAC list is defined by legislators. The goal is to provide doctors, hospitals, and 
ambulances with a reasonable level of access to a patient’s medical information while 
still preserving patient privacy. 
Moreover, interoperability between different medical information systems which 
cannot communicate with each other is another of the S -TTP’s responsibilities. They 
must be able to recognise a message’s context and convert heterogeneous medical 
information into a unified format [4]. This allows medical information to be 
exchanged across different healthcare systems. 
Accountability is possible only when the S-TTPs are able to provide strong 
security mechanisms such as access control, audit trails, and authentication of the 
patient, Smart Phones, Authorised Persons, and Authorised Devices. For example all 
access to the medical records must be logged and entered in an audit trail by the S-
TTPs.
3.2  Data Security in the Framework
In terms of security, this framework relies on PKI, SSL/TLS, and Biometric 
Identification. The SSL/TLS protocol is used for implementing secure sessions 
between a Smart Phone, an Authorised Device, and a Trusted Third Party. The PKI is 
used by the SP and AD to generate Non-Repudiable messages. Biometric 
Identification is employed to ensure that only Authorised Persons can access a 
patient’s medical information. PKI is an IT infrastructure which includes a set of 
procedures, policies, software, hardware, and network services that support security 
mechanisms such as confidentiality, integrity, authentication, and non-repudiation 
[10]. PKI utilises public and private keys for encryption and decryption of sensitive 
information [11]. 
Biometrics refers to automated techniques for uniquely recognising a person based 
on a natural physiological or behavioural feature. Features such as the face, 
fi ngerprints, hand geometry, handwriting, iris patterns, retinal patterns, veins, and 
voice are measured for recognition. Biometric technologies are emerging as a 
foundation of extremely secure identification and personal verification            
solutions [12].
3.3  Wireless Communications in the Framework
In relation to IP-Wireless and contactless communication, the framework uses Next 
Generation Network and Near Field Communication technologies respectively. The 
NGN is utilised to establish Internet Protocol (IP) based wireless communication 
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TTP. The NFC is used to facilitate contactless communication between the AD and 
SP. 
A Next Generation Network is an IP-based network that handles multiple types of 
traffic (such as voice, data, and multimedia). It is the convergence of service provider 
networks including the Public Switched Telephone Network (PSTN), the Internet, and 
the wireless network [13]. We contend that it is possible to access a wide range 
of ubiquitous e-health services through this unified network. Java SIM Cards are 
already used in the NGN for authentication, communication and security; we believe 
it is possible to expand those functionalities by using the JSC as a portable repository 
of EHR data at the patient point-of-care.
Near Field Communication  is a wireless connectivity technology evolving from a 
combination of contactless identification and networking technologies [14]. It enables 
convenient short-range communication between electronic devices and smart objects. 
In our framework NFC plays the role of a contactless communication protocol 
between a Smart Phone and an Authorised Device. Through this technology patients 
can send their consent to the Authorised Device and an Authorised Person can see the 
patient’s critical health information contained within a patient’s device when it is 
needed. The communication protocols in which these devices can work together via 
NFC are outlined in Section 4.
3.4  Data Storage in the Framework  
In terms of storing medical data our framework use two large databases at the national 
and state level and a portable small one which is carried by patients in their Java SIM 
Cards. This portable database is responsible for storing critical medical information. 
A Java SIM Card is a Subscriber Identity Module (SIM) card for mobile networks 
which is made based on a Java Card. It is highly secure, efficient, easy to manage and 
provides many possibilities for supporting various applications [15], and is thus well-
suited to storing healthcare records. 
3.5  Proposed Local Communication Framework  
As shown in Fig. 2, for the purpose of storing an individual’s lifetime health 
information, the local framework contains two central databases called the Australian-
Electronic Health Record Centre (AU-EHRC) and Queensland-Electronic Health 
Record Centre (QLD-EHRC) in our particular example. In addition, Java SIM Cards
are used as a patient point-of-care medical information repository. The state level 
QLD-EHRC database includes only a copy of records for those patients who already 
live in Queensland or who temporarily visit the state. If a patient visits or moves to 
any state in Australia, other than his/her own state and needs medical care, the 
medical record is automatically fet ched from the national database (AU-EHRC) and 
inserted into the visited state’s database such as the QLD-EHRC. This strategy 
minimises traffic to the national AU-EHRC in a way similar to GSM mobile networks 
[16].
For the purpose of security, various mechanisms and protocols such as Biometric 
Identification, the Secure Sockets Layer/Transport Layer Security (SSL/TLS) protocol 
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patients’ medical information. As we assume the communication between the Smart 
Phone or Authorised Device and S-TTP is based on a Next Generation Network which 
uses the Internet as a carrier, our framework must use PKI and SSL/TLS for the 
purpose of data confidentiality, integrity, authentication, and non-repudiation. These 
technologies enable the SP, AD, and TTP to exchange sensitive information through 
the unsecure public network. The patient’s Private Key is stored in the Java SIM Card
which has the capability of operating cryptographic algorithms, while the patient’s 
Public Key is stored by the AU-TTP and QLD-TTP.
Biometric Identification such as fingerprints must be used for accurately
authenticating a patient or an AP. In principle, biometrics cannot be forgotten or lost, 
and are difficult to duplicate or share among different users [17]. A biometrics 
authentication system requires the physical presence of the individual. Among several 
biometric technologies, fingerprints have been in use for the longest time and have
more advantages than others. For instance, there are many devices such as Smart 
Phones on the market that are equipped with a fingerprint scanner. A fingerprint is 
captured via live scan and then its features are retrieved. The retrieved fi ngerprint’s
features are then fed into the JSC, where the fingerprint template is stored, for the 
matching process. If a match is made, access to the medical information will be 
granted.
Fig. 2. Local Framework for Managing Ubiquitous Electronic Health Records
83.6  Contents of a Java SIM Card (JSC)
Fig. 3 splits the patient’s Java SIM Card into three layers for managing ubiquitous 
Electronic Health Records: the application and database layer (Applet Layer ), the 
Java Card Runtime Environment (JCRE) layer, and the OS/Hardware layer. While 
the JCRE and OS/HW layers are specific to a particular computing platform, we 
require an Applet Layer to address the design requirements specific to the 
development of Ubiquitous Access to Electronic Health Records. 
Fig. 3. Java SIM Card Architecture for Managing EHRs
The Applet Layer must consist of an EHR-Manager, PKI, NFC, Identification 
Algorithm (IA), NGN Interfaces and other applets as necessary. Additionally, this 
layer includes the Private Cryptographic Key and a small database which contains 
critical medical information such as past medical history, blood type, allergies, and 
the http links (Uniform Resource Locator) to original records and medical images in 
the central database.
The EHR-Manager interface is needed to handle communication between                
the state-level QLD-TTP and the Java SIM Card  in order to update the EHRs 
contained within the Java SIM Card. After an Authorised Person updates a patient’s 
EHRs within the QLD-EHRC, the QLD-TTP automatically updates the EHR within 
the JSC by using the EHR-Manager interface, Smart Phone, Next Generation 
Network, SSL/TLS protocol and Over The Air (OTA) and SIM Tool Kit (STK) 
technologies. OTA and STK  technologies are widely adopted in mobile 
communication systems to read and write the contents of Java SIM Cards [18].  After 
a patient confirms the acknowledgement SMS message coming from the QLD-TTP, 
the update will be done. 
The JSC must be equipped with a Near Field Communication Application 
Programming Interface (NFC API) in order to exchange information with an 
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Phone and Authorised Device to have contactless communication. By using the NFC 
a Smart Phone is able to send a patient’s consent to the Authorised Device or 
the Authorised Person is able to see the patient’s EHR within the JSC. There are 
many mobile phones such as the Nokia 6216 and 5800 in the market that support a 
SIM-based NFC interface. 
The Identification Algorithm (IA) is needed for the challenge-response mechanism 
occurring between the Smart Phone or Authorized Device and the QLD-TTP. 
Challenge-response is important in the process of identifying a remote source as 
either an individual or a device. This algorithm works similarly to GSM 
authentication [19]. IA uses the challenge and the unique embedded information 
which is stored within a tamper-resistant Java SIM Card to generate a Fresh ID. The 
unique embedded information include the SIM ID, device serial No, scanned 
Fingerprint, name, and National ID. 
As shown in Fig. 3, the Java SIM Card must also be facilitated with a Public Key 
Infrastructure API in order to implement secure sessions between the SP and AD and 
QLD-TTP and produce Non-Repudiable m essages. We assume that all the Public 
Keys of the patients who reside in QLD are stored in the QLD-TTP and it is 
responsible for managing them. Therefore, if the AD needs to communicate with the 
SP, it must first connect to the QLD-TTP to get the patient’s Public Key. Moreover, 
the AU-TTP must be able to put the patients’ Private Keys on their Java SIM Cards
remotely by using Over The Air (OTA) and SIM Tool Kit (STK) technologies. 
For the sake of clarity, we suppose that when the SP needs to send any information 
to the AD or QLD-TTP, this information must be encrypted by the Private Key which 
is contained within the patient’s JSC. An Authorised Device or QLD-TTP can decrypt 
the message received from a Smart Phone by using the patient’s Public Key.  If the 
AD needs to send any information to the SP, first it must get the patient’s Public Key
from the QLD-TTP, and then it must encrypt the information with the patient’s Public 
Key. The SP can decrypt the message received from the AD or QLD-TTP by using its 
own Private Key within the JSC. 
The Java SIM Card is a multi-application environment. Multiple applets from 
different vendors can coexist in a single card, and additional applets can be 
downloaded after card manufacture. An applet often stores highly sensitive 
information, such as EHRs, fingerprints, private cryptographic keys, and so on. 
Sharing such sensitive data among applets must be carefully limited [20]. Therefore, 
for further security the JSC must have a firewall between the applets in order to 
achieve isolation and restrict access to the data of one applet from another as shown in 
Fig. 3.
Furthermore, in the case of the Java SIM Card being lost or stolen, the JSC can 
protect the information within the card by requiring a fi ngerprint and PIN code to 
access the patient’s medical information. Also after the QLD-TTT is aware of a card 
going missing, it can remotely disable the card and delete all personal information 
inside the card.
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4 Communication Protocols
In Section 3, we introduced a framework in which an Authorised Person such as a 
doctor is able to have Ubiquitous Access to a patient’s medical record on a national 
scale. We also saw what components the framework needs and how the components 
fit together in general terms. In this section we briefly summarised the three different 
protocols needed for communication between the Smart Phone (SP), Authorised 
Device (AD), and Trusted Third Party (TTP). All three protocols work on the 
application layer which means they are independent of the underlying protocol layers 
for end-to-end communication. The application layer is the 7th layer in the Open 
Source Interconnection (OSI) reference model [21] and is closest to the end user. The 
SP, AD, and TTP protocols define the processes and procedures that must be followed 
when these agents want to request data from, respond to and communicate with each 
other. The protocols are designed to cover different emergency and non emergency 
scenarios.
The Smart Phone (SP) protocol is used when a patient wants to request data from, 
respond to,  or communicate with Authorised Devices  (AD) or a Trusted Third Party
(TTP). In total the SP protocol requires seven major processes and procedures: 
Authenticating the Patient, Modifying an Access Control List, Viewing EHRs,  
Identifying the Patient, Granting Consent, Generating Non-repudiable Consent, and 
Handling an Emergency situation. The Authenticating the Patient process is used by 
an SP to prevent an unauthorised person from using a patients’ Smart Phone to access 
their medical information. The Modifying an Access Control List process is used to 
give the power to patients to decide who can access their medical record. The Viewing 
EHRs  process is used to enable a patient to view his or her centralised Electronic 
Health Record via a Smart Phone. The Identifying the Patient procedure is used by 
the TTP to identify a patient when they want to request data from the TTP. The 
Generating Non-repudiable Consent procedure is used to make a patient accountable 
when he or she gives consent. The Handling an Emergency process is used to detect 
and inform a patient’s location, and automatically call and send a patient’s details to 
an Emergency Room.
The AD protocol is used when an Authorised Person  (AP) such as a doctor wants 
to request data from, respond to, or communicate with patient’s Smart Phone (SP) or 
a Trusted Third Party (TTP). In total the AD protocol requires seven major processes 
and procedures: Authenticating an Authorised Person, Identifying an Authorised 
Person, Getting Consent, Establishing NFC Communication, Generating Referral 
Letter, Non-Repudiable Setup Message, and Verifying a Referral Letter. The 
Authenticating an Authorised Person process is used by an AD to prevent an 
unauthorised person from using the AD to access the patient’s medical information.
The Identifying an Authorised Person procedure is used by a TTP to identify an AP 
accurately when he or she wants  to have access to data from the TTP. The 
Establishing NFC Communication process is used by an AD to establish an NFC 
session with the SP. The Generating Referral Letter process is used by an AP to send 
a RL to a specialist.  The Non-Repudiable Setup Message procedure is used by the 
AD to introduce itself to the SP. The Verifying a Referral Letter process is used by an 
AP to have access to a patient’s RL from the TTP. 
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The Trusted Third Party (TTP) protocol is used when the TTP wants to request 
data from, respond to or communicate with the Smart Phone (SP) and Authorised 
Device (AD). In total the TTP protocol requires five major processes: Establishing a 
SSL/TLS Session, Verifying a Setup Message, Verifying Patient Consent, Identifying 
the SP or AD, and Storing or Retrieving a Referral Letter. All these processes are 
used to link the SP’s and AD’s processes and procedures.
While complex, all of these protocols can be implemented using existing 
technologies. Elsewhere we have modeled the protocols in ISO’s Specification and 
Description Language and have simulated their behaviour in the UPPAAL model 
checker.
5 Conclusion 
Ubiquitous  access to a patient’s medical records is an important aspect of caring for 
the patient. Using new technologies such as Java SIM Cards to address the challenges 
of ubiquitous access to EHRs is vital for current healthcare systems. While full EHRs 
can be accessed from an Electronic Health Records Centre (EHRC), partial EHRs 
contained within a Java SIM Card can be used at the patient point-of-care to help 
quick diagnosis of a patient’s problems. By taking advantage of the Java SIM Card
and related communication and security technologies, we proposed a secure 
framework and communication protocols which provide a solution for ubiquitous 
access to EHRs without imposing any major changes on existing infrastructure. 
Acknowledgments
We wish to thank the anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments. 
Reference 
1. Institute-of-Medicine. To err is human: Building a safer health system.  2000  [cited 2008 
September 23]; Available from: www.nap.edu/books/0309068371/html .
2. Abraham, C., Watson, R. T., and Boudreau, M.-C., Ubiquitous access: on the front lines of 
patient care and safety. Communications of the ACM, 2008. 51(6): 95-99.
3. Issa, O., Gregoire, J. C., Belala, Y., and James, W. 3G Embedded Communication System 
for Medical Applications. 2nd Annual IEEE Systems Conference 2008.
4. Chenhui, Z., Huilong, D., and Xudong, L. An Integration Approach of Healthcare 
Information System. International Conference on BioMedical Engineering and Informatics. 
2008.
5. Bishop, B., Maloney, D., Wilson, P., Nader, N., Sembritzki, J., Meazzini, G., and Morency, 
D., US cards hold medical records. Card Technology Today, 2000. 12(6): 14-15.
6. Chan, A. T. S., Cao , J., Chan , H., and Young , G., A web-enabled framework for smart 
card applications in health services. Communications of the ACM, 2001. 44(9): 76-82.
7. Chang, Y. F., Chen, C. S., and Zhou, H., Smart phone for mobile commerce. Computer 
Standards & Interfaces, 2009. 31(4): 740-747.
8. Kim, D.-K., Mehta, P., and Gokhale, P. Describing access control models as design patterns 
using roles. Paper presented at the Proceedings of the 2006 conference on Pattern languages 
of programs. Retrieved, from.
12
9. Alhaqbani, B. and Fidge, C. Access Control Requirements for Processing Electronic Health 
Records. Proceedings of Business Process Management Workshops. 2007. Brisbane, 
Australia: Springer.
10.Kambourakis, G., Maglogiannis, I., and Rouskas, A., PKI-based secure mobile access to 
electronic health services and data. Technology & Health Care, 2005. 13(6): 511-526.
11.Articsoft. Introduction to Public Key Infrastructure.  2009  [cited 2009 May 10]; Available 
from: http://www.governmentsecurity.org/forum/index.php?showtopic=1630.
12.The Biometric Consortium. An Introduction to Biometric.  2009  [cited 2009 May 10]; 
Available from: http://www.biometrics.org/html/introduction.html.
13.ITU-T Next Generation Network. Definition of Next Generation Network.  2009  [cited 10 
May, 2009]; Available from: http://www.itu.int/ITU-
T/studygroups/com13/ngn2004/working_definition.html.
14.Morak, J., Hayn, D., Kastner, P., Drobics, M., and Schreier, G. Near Field Communication 
Technology as the Key for Data Acquisition in Clinical Research. Near Field 
Communication, 2009. NFC '09. First International Workshop on. 2009.
15.Tele Pak. JAVA SIM card.  2009  [cited 23 December, 2009]; Available from: 
http://www.tele-pak.com/plastic-cards/javacards.html.
16.Peersman, C., Cvetkovic, S., Griffiths, P., and Spear, H., The Global System for Mobile 
Communications Short Message Service. Personal Communications, IEEE, 2000. 7(3): 15-
23.
17.Hu, J. Mobile fingerprint template protection: Progress and open issues. Industrial 
Electronics and Applications, 2008. ICIEA 2008. 3rd IEEE Conference on. 2008.
18.Chin, L.-P. and Chen, J.-Y. SIM card based e-cash applications in the mobile 
communication system using OTA and STK technology. Wireless, Mobile and Multimedia 
Networks, 2006 IET International Conference on. 2006.
19.Haverinen, H., Asokan, N., and Maattanen, T. Authentication and key generation for mobile 
IP using GSM authentication and roaming. Communications, 2001. ICC 2001. IEEE 
International Conference on. 2001.
20.Chen, Z., Technology for Smart Cards: Architecture and Programmer's Guide 2000: 
Pearson.
21.ITU-T X.210, ITU-T Recommendation X.210. 1993, Open Systems Interconnection - Basic 
Reference Model: Conventions for the Definition of OSI Services.
